CYBERSECURITY AND THE MARYLAND ELECTRIC GRID

Findings and Recommendations for the Office of the Attorney General and the Maryland Cybersecurity Council

December 2021
Abstract

This report offers findings and cybersecurity policy recommendations for electric distribution systems in Maryland, with an emphasis on the regulated electric distribution systems. Examples of actions taken by other states are also included. The recommendations provided in this paper are tailored to the electricity sector, but may be useful to other sectors of critical infrastructure as well.

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Cybersecurity and The Maryland Electric Grid

This paper provides cybersecurity policy recommendations for electric distribution systems in Maryland, with an emphasis on the regulated electric distribution systems. Although there are many forms of critical infrastructure, including financial services, communications, healthcare, and water systems, these all rely on the electric grid for operation. Therefore, damage, disruption, or unauthorized access to the electric grid can disrupt the reliable operation of other critical infrastructure assets. The recommendations provided in this paper are tailored to the electricity sector, but may be useful to other sectors of critical infrastructure as well.

The electric grid is currently undergoing a dramatic transformation which has massive cybersecurity implications. New technology is being connected to the grid, combining legacy systems and smart grid components, but technical standards for interconnection and cybersecurity are still in development. Legislation and regulations are emerging at the state and federal levels to address smart grid development. However, cybersecurity advancements are not often integrated with these efforts.

The policy recommendations made here are based on research and interviews with electric grid cybersecurity stakeholders. Legislative and regulatory actions, academic and technical reports, published standards and best practices, and news media reporting provided a foundation. Interviews were conducted with members of various state agencies, including the Maryland Public Service Commission (MPSC), Maryland Energy Administration (MEA), and Maryland Department of Emergency Management. Public Utility Commissions in other states were also contacted. Subject matter experts from non-government entities such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and Auburn University McCrary Institute provided additional insights.

Some of the recommendations in this paper may be implemented by utilities currently. The cybersecurity posture and practices of utilities are not made public. Detailed information about regulator preparations for cybersecurity reporting also were not accessible. A complete picture of the current state of cybersecurity for the electric grid was not available to the author. The recommendations made are based on best practices and standards, but do not necessarily address an existing shortcoming of current practices.

Climate Change and the Evolving Electric Grid

How problems are perceived combined with power dynamics can be strong indicators of which problems will be addressed. Let’s compare climate change to cybersecurity.

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1 This report was authored by Laura Corcoran, an NSA Fellow, who served for twelve months in the Office of the Maryland Attorney General. She completed the report in fulfillment of her Fellowship’s scope of work. The report was conducted for both the Office of the Attorney General and the Maryland Cybersecurity Council. The findings and recommendations were briefed to the Council’s Subcommittee on Critical Infrastructure and then to the full Council. The Office of the Attorney General is extremely grateful to the NSA for approving Ms. Corcoran’s fellowship with its office and for the excellent report that she produced.

Climate change is perceived by the majority of Americans as an existential threat. Corporate lobbying efforts are well funded. “With massive economic interests at stake with each regulation aimed at curbing climate change, it comes as no surprise that vast sums are spent to petition government about them. For example, one of the greenest utilities in the nation, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) spent the second highest amount (an estimated $27 million) of all firms lobbying on climate change in 2008 — just behind ExxonMobil, which spent $29 million lobbying and produces an estimated 306 million tons of [greenhouse gas] emissions.”

Maryland has several state entities focused on addressing climate change, including the Department of the Environment, Department of Natural Resources, and the Maryland Energy Administration. There are state funds available to encourage climate change programs, such as the Maryland Strategic Energy Investment Fund which received $47 million in the 2020 Maryland Budget. Recently $93 million in federal funding was provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to strengthen Maryland’s ability to prevent and respond to climate change related natural disasters.

On the other hand, cybersecurity is perceived by many as a “technical issue” as opposed to an existential threat. A review of twelve publicly traded security firms showed a combined nationwide total of $3.29 million in lobbying spending in 2019.

Maryland has an Office of Security Management within the Department of Information Technology that oversees security for the executive branch of state government entities only. The Maryland Cybersecurity Investment Fund received $0.9 million in 2020.

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10 COMAR 01.01.2019.07 Maryland Cyber Defense Initiative.
This contrast of perceptions and power dynamic between climate change and cybersecurity is stark. Yet climate change and cybersecurity are intimately connected when it comes to the electric grid. The electric grid is changing from a relatively closed system to a complex, highly interconnected environment. A main driver for this transformation: climate change.13

To address climate change, the electric grid is modernizing to allow for two-way communications with distributed energy resources (DER) such as solar farms, battery storage, electric vehicle charging stations, and microgrids, as well as monitoring and control systems. These changes to the grid are undertaken to enable adoption and implementation of climate change mitigation policies.

Who oversees this transformation? As a general rule, the federal government regulates the generation and transmission of electricity, whereas the distribution systems are regulated primarily by states.15 Electricity distribution systems are “growing more vulnerable, in part because their industrial control systems increasingly allow remote access and connect to business networks. As a result, threat actors can use multiple techniques to access those systems and potentially disrupt operations.”16

“As the lead federal agency for the energy sector, the Department of Energy (DOE) has developed plans to implement the national cybersecurity strategy for the grid, but these plans do not fully address risks to the grid’s distribution systems.”17 DOE plans prioritized addressing risks to the grid’s generation and transmission systems.18 Since states are responsible for cybersecurity of distribution systems, prioritizing federal support to states and industry to improve grid distribution systems’ cybersecurity likely will require additional planning by DOE.19

There are important aspects of grid security that are not controlled by the federal government, but are left to the states. Each state has a regulatory body that oversees electric distribution operations. In Maryland, the Public Service Commission is the regulatory authority for the utility companies. In 2016 the MPSC opened a docket to address certain issues of electric grid modernization.20 Technologies to be addressed included advanced metering infrastructure, electric vehicles, distributed energy resources such as solar and wind, and energy storage.

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14 There are others as well, including protecting the ecological environment and guaranteeing the energy supply.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 “IN THE MATTER OF TRANSFORMING MARYLAND’S ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS TO ENSURE THAT ELECTRIC SERVICE IS CUSTOMER-CENTERED, AFFORDABLE, RELIABLE AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE IN MARYLAND”, PC44, filed September 26, 2016.
The MPSC describes Maryland’s clean energy goals as ambitious.\textsuperscript{21} Maryland has been recognized for its efforts in grid modernization.\textsuperscript{22} Maryland state officials have taken a leading role in setting grid modernization policy.\textsuperscript{23} Likewise, cybersecurity goals for Maryland’s electric grid should be equally ambitious and Maryland should hold a leading role in setting grid cybersecurity policy. This will require policymakers and regulators to embrace the intimate relationship between climate change, grid modernization, and cybersecurity risk management.

**Cybersecurity Challenges of Utilities Serving Maryland**

The cooperation and coordination challenges involved in minimizing the security risks of the modernized electric grid have many similarities to the governance of climate change. “Both are ‘superwicked’ problems that are transboundary in nature, occur at multiple levels across sectors, between institutions, and will impact all actors, both public and private, in complex, interconnected, and often highly politicized ways.”\textsuperscript{24}

A variety of cybersecurity barriers exist with respect to the electric grid.\textsuperscript{25} For example, cyber threats are unpredictable and evolve faster than the industry’s ability to develop and deploy countermeasures. Security upgrades to legacy systems are constrained by inherent limitations of the equipment and architectures. Performance/acceptance testing of new control and communication solutions is difficult without disrupting operations. Threat, vulnerability, incident, and mitigation information sharing is insufficient among government and industry. Pre-incident, the business case for cybersecurity investment by industry seems weak. Regulatory uncertainty for cybersecurity of emerging technology exists. The adversaries that target the electric grid are advanced persistent threats.\textsuperscript{26}

The stakes for protecting the grid are extremely high. According to President Biden, “It’s more than likely we’re going to end up, if we end up in a war - a real shooting war with a major power - it’s going to be as

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{22} See e.g. “Grid Modernization Index 2018: Key Indicators for a Changing Electric Grid”, Gridwise Alliance, December 5, 2018. https://gridwise.org/grid-modernization-index-2018/
\item \textsuperscript{23} For example, MPSC is an active member of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) and The Hon. Anthony O’Donnell has served as a panelist on Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure for the NARUC 2019 Winter Policy Summit. Dr. Mary Beth Tung, the Director of the Maryland Energy Administration is a Board Member for the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO). https://www.naseo.org/board (last accessed September 21, 2021). See also “Maryland Announces Plan for Electric Grid of the Future”, February 11, 2021 https://news.maryland.gov/mea/2021/02/11/maryland-announces-plan-for-electric-grid-of-the-future/
\item \textsuperscript{26} “An adversary that possesses sophisticated levels of expertise and significant resources which allow it to create opportunities to achieve its objectives by using multiple attack vectors, including cyber, physical, and deception.” Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5, September 2020. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf.
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a consequence of a cyber breach of great consequence, and [our adversaries’ capabilities are] increasing exponentially.”

The process of modernizing the grid is ongoing. “The very nature of Grid Modernization dictates that there isn’t an end state where we celebrate our final successes and catalog accomplishments for posterity’s sake. In reality, we’re developing systems that will require input and management for generations to come.”

Perhaps the greatest barrier to grid cybersecurity is due to a lack of resources. Cost-effectiveness is a statutory requirement placed on utilities regulated by the Maryland Public Service Commission. However, methods for measuring the effectiveness of cyber security investments are evolving.

“Currently, significant uncertainty surrounds cyber security investments.” The relationship between investment in countermeasures verses increased costs due to cyber-attacks has not been definitively characterized. “Anecdotal evidence and cybersecurity practitioners point out that an inadequate level of cybersecurity exposes entities to a higher risk of a successful attack and higher costs.” Although recent publications addressing theoretical aspects of cybersecurity investment decision-making are available, empirical literature is at an early stage, likely because of data scarcity.

Human resources are also in scarce supply. “In the United States, there are around 879,000 cybersecurity professionals in the workforce and an unfilled need for another 359,000 workers, according to a 2020 survey by (ISC)2, an international nonprofit that offers cybersecurity training and certification programs. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics projects ‘information security analyst’ will be the 10th fastest growing occupation over the next decade, with an employment growth rate of 31% compared to the 4% average growth rate for all occupations.”

All of these challenges increase the complexity of building, maintaining, and regulating the grid. This report will make recommendations for legislators and regulators to address some of these challenges.

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29 “It is the goal of the State that each electric company provide its customers with high levels of service quality and reliability in a cost-effective manner, as measured by objective and verifiable standards, and that each electric company be held accountable if it fails to deliver reliable service according to those standards.” Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. § 7-213.
32 Ibid.
Recommendations

The following sections provide recommendations that can be implemented by state officials. Some are legislative actions, others are regulatory recommendations, and a number can be implemented at the agency level.

Regulatory Goals

The entity that regulates electric companies in Maryland is the Public Service Commission. Maryland has set forth a goal in statute “that each electric company provide its customers with high levels of service quality and reliability in a cost-effective manner, as measured by objective and verifiable standards, and that each electric company be held accountable if it fails to deliver reliable service according to those standards.” The statute includes six specific topics to be addressed by the standards and allows for “a separate reliability standard for each electric company in order to account for system reliability differentiating factors.” There should be a clear mandate for cyber resiliency as a regulatory goal.

RECOMMENDATION 1. Amend Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. § 7-213(e)(1)(i) “Service quality and reliability standards” to include “cyber resiliency” in the list of topics to be addressed by the standards.

Objective and verifiable standards are the key to measuring reliability. Grid reliability grid is accomplished through resiliency – the ability to withstand certain types of failure and yet remain functional from the customer perspective. In particular, cyber resiliency is the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises on cyber resources.

Maryland law has addressed resiliency in the context of climate change. “‘Resilience infrastructure’ means infrastructure that mitigates the effects of climate change. ‘Resilience infrastructure’ includes flood barriers, green spaces, building elevation, and stormwater infrastructure.” There is one statute within the Maryland Public Utilities Code that mentions “resiliency”: the Energy Storage Pilot Program. It requires investor-owned utility companies participating in the pilot program to report on resiliency benefits, but not risks. In fact, “benefit” appears ten times in the statute, “risk” is not mentioned at all.

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36 Ibid.

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RECOMMENDATION 2. Climate change is a long-term problem that motivates modernization of the electric grid. Solutions to address climate change must not invite near-term catastrophe. Any changes to the grid made for the sake of resiliency, efficiency, conservation, or climate change concerns must be accompanied by a careful assessment to document security risks prior to grid integration and implement appropriate mitigations during integration. The risk assessments must take into account the scope of specific projects and the project’s interfaces with other systems.

The “Resilient Maryland Program” managed by the Maryland Energy Administration (MEA) does not include any cybersecurity requirement for the microgrid grant. The current statutory definition of “resilience infrastructure” focuses on climate change. Increased vulnerability of the electric grid from cyber threats is an effect of climate change. Any programs that involve software or hardware connections to the grid must address cyber resilience.

RECOMMENDATION 3. Define “resilience” to include “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from deliberate attacks” so that cybersecurity will be an essential factor in determining system resilience.

Other states have defined “resilience” in ways that include grid modernization and cybersecurity issues. For example, Connecticut law includes “deliberate attacks” in their definition:

“‘Resilience’ means the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from deliberate attacks, accidents or naturally occurring threats or incidents, including, but not limited to, threats or incidents associated with the impacts of climate change.”

Illinois definition of “Resiliency improvement” goes beyond the environmental infrastructure and includes grid modernization components:

“Resilient improvement” means any fixture, product, system, equipment, device, material, or interacting group thereof intended to increase resilience or improve the durability of infrastructure, including but not limited to, ... energy storage, microgrids, and backup power generation.”

Taking cybersecurity issues into consideration when adopting statutory definitions will elevate cybersecurity priority. Additional definitions will be recommended in the following sections.

Building Cyber Resiliency
The path to cyber resiliency is paved with cybersecurity best practices and standards compliance. Cyber resiliency design principles should be applied to enhance the security of the grid. Cyber resiliency design

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41 A review of application materials and announcements for the program reveals no information concerning cybersecurity requirements. Interviews with the Maryland Energy Administration confirmed the lack of cybersecurity requirements. See https://energy.maryland.gov/business/pages/ResilientMaryland.aspx.
42 C.G.S.A. § 16-244aa. Performance-based regulation of electric distribution companies. Effective: October 2, 2020. Also C.G.S.A. § 16-243y. Microgrid and resilience grant and loan pilot program to support distributed energy generation for critical facilities. Effective: October 2, 2020
strategies incorporate the assumption that compromised resources exist in the system. The concept of zero-trust architecture has emerged in response to this assumption. “Zero-trust is a cybersecurity paradigm focused on resource protection and the premise that trust is never granted implicitly but must be continually evaluated.”

RECOMMENDATION 4. Require utility providers to adopt security best practices such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and advance toward zero-trust architecture both with on-premises services and cloud services. Report to regulators on steps already completed. Identify the steps that will have the most immediate security impact, and a schedule to implement them.

RECOMMENDATION 5. Require utility providers to incrementally implement zero trust principles, process changes, and technology solutions that protect data assets and business functions by use case. Develop and maintain dynamic risk-based policies for resource access. Authenticate all connections and encrypt data. Design cybersecurity of newly interconnected resources around zero-trust principles.

RECOMMENDATION 6. Consult with grid owners and operators, and state and local government agencies to establish a process to identify, assess, and prioritize risks to the electric grid, considering current and foreseeable future cyber and physical threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Apply the process to periodically report to regulators on the risks. Use the report to establish a risk-based grant program focused on systematically increasing the resilience of the electric grid against the prioritized cybersecurity risks where market forces do not provide sufficient private-sector incentives to mitigate the risk without Government investment.

RECOMMENDATION 7. Maryland is a leader in grid modernization efforts in the US. Engage state employees in cybersecurity standards development efforts to share knowledge and insights, and influence future directions.

A list of standards and guidelines for distributed energy resources can be found in Appendix D.

Opportunities to Incorporate Security by Design Principles
The most cost-effective approach to cybersecurity incorporates cybersecurity best practices in the design phase. This is known as “Security by Design.” Cybersecurity risks are considered from the beginning of a project and the design incorporates security from the ground up.

“While integrating information technologies is essential to building the smart grid and realizing its benefits, the same networked technologies add complexity and also introduce new interdependencies

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and vulnerabilities. Approaches to secure these technologies and to protect privacy must be designed and implemented early in the transition to the smart grid.”

Maryland is a leader in grid modernization which means Maryland must be a leader in incorporating security by design. There are many opportunities for Maryland to apply Security by Design in the transition to a smart grid by creating a requirement to consider and report on cybersecurity risks and mitigations where changes start, including pilot programs, grant programs, working groups, and with permit applications such as a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for new generating stations.

**RECOMMENDATION 8.** Include a formal requirement for all state funded grant recipients working on electric grid resilience or modernization to address cybersecurity risk both in the design and reporting phases of their work.

**RECOMMENDATION 9.** Include a formal requirement for all MPSC working groups developing policy and planning for the grid to address cybersecurity risk in the reporting phase of their work.

**RECOMMENDATION 10.** Require electric grid resilience or modernization pilot programs to establish formal requirements for a cybersecurity plan. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities arise from weaknesses in: policy and procedure; architecture and design; configuration and maintenance; supply chain; hardware; physical access controls; software development; and communications and networks. An effective cybersecurity plan must address all of these areas.

**Utility Cybersecurity Reporting and Transparency**

In 2019 the MPSC Cybersecurity Reporting Working Group submitted a final report providing procedural recommendations to the Commission. Based on that report, MPSC issued an order requiring Maryland electric, gas, and water companies with more than 30,000 customers to provide periodic in-person confidential cybersecurity briefings.

The order contains definitions for “Information Technology System”, “Operational Technology System”, “Smart Grid System”, and “Security Breach”. It also includes a short list of authorized state representatives who may attend the briefings, ten topic areas to be addressed, and a briefing schedule for years 2019-2024. The original cybersecurity briefing schedule had two electric companies report each year, with each company reporting once every three years (see Table 1 - Original Three-Year Audit

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48 See MD Code, Public Utilities, § 7-207. Certificate of public convenience and necessity required before construction of generation station or qualified generator lead line, effective May 18, 2021.


51 MPSC Order No. 89015, February 4, 2019, Case No. 9492. BGE, Potomac Edison, Pepco and Delmarva, Choptank, SMECO, and Washington Gas and Light (WGL) were the electric companies affected by the order.
Cycle for Cybersecurity Briefings). The order also requires security breaches to be reported verbally to the MPSC within one business day of confirmation, with certain exceptions.

In 2019 the two largest companies presented briefings to the Commission as required by the order. In 2020, the two scheduled briefings were deferred due to COVID-19. MPSC planned to reach out to companies to reschedule deferred briefings in late 2021.

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Table 1 - Original Three-Year Audit Cycle for Cybersecurity Briefings

The ten topic areas listed in the order are adopted from the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) Cybersecurity Primer. The time period for reporting was selected because it is in sync with the FERC auditing schedule. All materials are collected by the utility at the end of the briefing and the MPSC does not store any cybersecurity briefing material. The utilities are required to retain the materials for at least five years.

The first two cybersecurity briefings were presented by BGE and Washington Gas and Light. The information provided centered on metrics such as phishing attempts, intrusion attempts, and cybersecurity maturity levels.

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52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
56 “Status of Utility Cybersecurity Briefings with the Commission”, Email from John Borkoski, Chief Engineer MPSC, June 3, 2021.
58 Interview with John Borkoski, Maryland Public Service Chief Engineer, January 19, 2021.
59 Email from Ted Davis, PSC Associate General Counsel Maryland Public Service Commission, May 28, 2021.
60 MPSC Order No. 89015, February 4, 2019, Case No. 9492.
61 Interview with John Borkoski, Maryland Public Service Chief Engineer, January 19, 2021.
RECOMMENDATION 11. Maturity level of a cybersecurity program should be a factor in establishing an appropriate reporting period for each utility. Each utility should provide sufficient evidence to establish the maturity level of the company’s cybersecurity program. The MPSC should then tailor the reporting period accordingly. For utilities that can provide persuasive evidence of a high level of maturity in their cybersecurity program, three years may be an adequate MPSC reporting period. For less mature programs, more frequent reporting to evidence growth in maturity level is recommended. An example of a maturity model available is The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) Version 2.0 (V2.0) which was released in July 2021.62

RECOMMENDATION 12. Information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems of utilities were likely developed separately and with separate groups of people. However, without strict network segregation, vulnerabilities in IT enable attacks on OT. Regulators must understand the extent to which utility IT and OT security experts work together to protect the grid and make recommendations to enhance communication within utility provider entities.

RECOMMENDATION 13. Utilities should work together and report together on risks and cybersecurity events. Bring GridEx participants together after the exercises are complete to assess and categorize impacts of issues that were identified.63

RECOMMENDATION 14. Each confidential cybersecurity brief required should be accompanied by a written report suitable for public release that summarizes the cybersecurity efforts of the company, especially with respect to modernization efforts.

Other states have addressed the issue of cybersecurity reporting to regulators. In Texas, the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) “contract with an entity to act as the PUCT’s cybersecurity monitor. The cybersecurity monitor manages a cybersecurity outreach program, communicating emerging threats and best business practices, reviewing cybersecurity self-assessments, researching and developing best business practices for cybersecurity, and reporting to the PUCT on cybersecurity preparedness for monitored utilities. In addition to monitored utilities, an electric utility, municipally owned utility, or electric cooperative operating solely outside the ERCOT region (non-ERCOT utility) may elect to participate in the Texas Cybersecurity Monitor Program.”64 Texas has confidential cybersecurity reports filed with ERCOT.65

63 GridEx, a distributed play grid exercise that allows participants to engage remotely, simulates a cyber and physical attack on the North American electricity grid and other critical infrastructure. Led by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), GridEx gives participants a forum to demonstrate how they would respond to and recover from coordinated cyber and physical security threats and incidents. https://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Pages/GridEx.aspx
65 See e.g. Docket no. 51878. http://interchange.puc.texas.gov/search/dockets/
Michigan allows electric providers to report “individually or jointly with other electric providers” on their cybersecurity program and related risk planning.\textsuperscript{66} It also specifies four types of incidents that must be orally reported “as soon as reasonably practicable and prior to any public notification”.\textsuperscript{67}

California Public Service Commission does not require cybersecurity reporting by utilities.\textsuperscript{68} Instead, they have two fulltime staff members dedicated to providing cybersecurity guidance to utilities. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center (CalCSIC) takes the lead on cybersecurity detection, response, mitigation, and recovery.\textsuperscript{69} “The California Cybersecurity Integration Center’s primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage California’s economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in [California].”\textsuperscript{70}

Transparency is another area that should be addressed. The utility companies and the MPSC understand that cybersecurity reporting information is sensitive and confidential so needs to be protected. Utilities are concerned that sensitive security specific information, if publicly released, could allow adversaries to identify, target, and attack potential weaknesses.\textsuperscript{71} The MPSC order states that cybersecurity reporting authorized representatives are prohibited from divulging information learned from the briefings.\textsuperscript{72} MPSC does not retain written material from briefings, but requires the utilities to store the briefing materials.\textsuperscript{73} However, public access to basic cybersecurity information is essential for public awareness and trust.

**RECOMMENDATION 15.** When smart meters were incorporated into the Maryland power grid, utilities were required to publicize security information about the change. This practice should be continued to include changes created by DER integration.\textsuperscript{74}

**RECOMMENDATION 16.** Although details of security processes and mechanisms should be protected as sensitive information, general information about utility security programs should be publicly available and easily accessible.\textsuperscript{75}

By providing general information on cybersecurity planning as the grid modernizes, the public will have a basis for trusting that cyber resiliency of the grid is being maintained. MPSC Commissioners Jason Stanek and Mindy Herman raised a transparency issue related to distributing grid planning. Chairman Stanek acknowledged that up until now, distribution planning was in the private domain of the utilities


\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{68} Interview with James Cho and Junaid Rahman, California Public Utilities Commission, June 10, 2021.


\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{72} MPSC Order No. 89015, February 4, 2019, Case No. 9492.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74} See e.g. “SMART METERS AND YOUR PRIVACY”, BGE informational brochure for customers. Author unknown, undated. https://www.bge.com/SmartEnergy/SmartMeterSmartGrid/Documents/SmartMeters_HealthPrivacyInfo.pdf

\textsuperscript{75} See e.g. PJM (a regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia) webpage that talks about cybersecurity practices at a very high level. https://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/keeping-the-lights-on/safeguarding-the-grid.
with approval from MPSC. He asked if the utility was prepared to make the process more transparent. The Exelon representative said the company is open to a more transparent distribution planning process. Commissioner Herman mentioned the distinction between planning input verses planning specifics and commented, “I hope we don’t use confidentiality to keep parties out” of the planning sessions.76 A similar exchange between Commissioner Tony O’Donnel and the SMECO and Potomac Edison representatives took place. Commissioner O’Donnel referred to the asymmetry of information existing between stakeholders and named it as a crucial piece in planning interconnections.77 He said the utilities have used a closely held planning process for a very long time but they need to open it up. He said the first step is for utilities to acknowledge that it has to occur. Transparency in general cybersecurity distribution planning will help to bolster public confidence.

Supply Chain78
Cybersecurity issues arising from the supply chain have been around for a long time. With regard to software,

“Supply chain attacks were first demonstrated around four decades ago, when Ken Thompson, one of the creators of the Unix operating system, wanted to see if he could hide a backdoor in Unix’s login function. Thompson didn’t merely plant a piece of malicious code that granted him the ability to log into any system. He built a compiler—a tool for turning readable source code into a machine-readable, executable program—that secretly placed the backdoor in the function when it was compiled. Then he went a step further and corrupted the compiler that compiled the compiler, so that even the source code of the user's compiler wouldn't have any obvious signs of tampering. "The moral is obvious," Thompson wrote in a lecture explaining his demonstration in 1984. "You can’t trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.)"79

The Federal Acquisition Regulations System recently published a new rule that defines supply chain risk as “the risk that any person may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, extract data, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, maintenance, disposition, or retirement of covered articles so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise manipulate the function, use, or operation of the covered articles or information stored or transmitted by or through covered articles.”80 The new rule also describes supply chain risk information and includes

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77 Ibid.
78 NIST defines supply chain as a “Linked set of resources and processes between and among multiple tiers of organizations, each of which is an acquirer, that begins with the sourcing of products and services and extends through their life cycle.” Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5, September 2020. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf.
lists of characteristics and relevant factors to consider. These lists could serve as a guide when collecting and assessing information for supply chain risk determination.

Currently, Maryland has regulations that mention “supply chain” with respect to pharmaceuticals, food, offshore wind facilities, and demographic diversity. Drugs are required to have a record of the tracking of a drug or device through the supply chain, with each trading partner authenticating the drug or device upon receipt and transfer. Food safety plans are required to include written preventative controls that address the supply chain. MPSC has established a Supplier Diversity Program to “promote economical delivery of utility services and positively impact the economy of the State.” In addition, the Maryland Offshore Wind Business Development Advisory Committee, that advises the Maryland Energy Administration (MEA) on how to best spend funds, is required to have one individual with experience in offshore wind supply chain issues.

Other states have considered supply chain issues with respect to cybersecurity. For example, Texas created the “Cybersecurity Coordination Program for Utilities” to monitor cybersecurity efforts among utilities in the state. The program includes “guidance on best practices for cybersecurity controls for supply chain risk management of cybersecurity systems used by utilities, which may include, as applicable, best practices related to: (A) software integrity and authenticity; (B) vendor risk management and procurement controls, including notification by vendors of incidents related to the vendor’s products and services; and (C) vendor remote access.”

After the major power outage Texas experienced in early 2021, the Texas state legislature created the “Texas Electricity Supply Chain Security and Mapping Committee”. “Electricity supply chain” is defined to include “facilities and methods used for producing, treating, processing, pressurizing, storing, or transporting natural gas for delivery to electric generation facilities; and critical infrastructure necessary to maintain electricity service.” The purpose of the committee is to plan and prepare for extreme weather events. It is required to prepare a public report by January 1, 2022, that includes a list of the established best practices and recommended oversight and compliance standards adopted by the commission.

In New York, supply chain was addressed in the context of electronic voting systems devices. “The minimum security standards for such devices shall be commensurate with the level of security risk

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81 Ibid.
82 COMAR 20.61.06.03 Evaluation criteria.
83 COMAR 20.08.01.01 Declaration of Public policy.
84 COMAR 10.13.02.02 Definitions.
85 COMAR 10.15.09.17 Milk Facility Construction and Plan Submission.
88 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
applicable to such devices and shall specifically take into account any security risk associated with voting
equipment-related supply chains in addition to any other applicable security risk.”

To improve security with respect to the supply chain, uncover blind spots in partnerships and extend the
reach of information sharing.

RECOMMENDATION 17. Require all utilities that rely on third party IT or OT providers to
include standard contract language with service providers to collect and preserve data for
cybersecurity analysis and share such data, or report third party security breaches to the
utility or to a government entity such as CISA.

RECOMMENDATION 18. Adopt the NIST definition of “critical software” and require utilities
to maintain a list of the categories of software and software products in use or in acquisition
that meet the definition. Adopt NIST security guidance for critical software use, applying
practices of least privilege, network segmentation, and proper configuration.

RECOMMENDATION 19. Require utilities to establish minimum security standards for IT and
OT devices commensurate with the level of security risk applicable to such devices and
specifically take into account any security risk associated with supply chains.

Financial and Human Resources
Investing in cybersecurity is investing in the future of the organization. “In today’s data-driven, global,
mobile, always-connected economy, cybersecurity is an enabling technology that allows you do to
business. It is the foundation for everything you do.”

Maryland has taken important steps to address the financial and human resource barriers affecting
cybersecurity of critical infrastructure within the state. For example, The Joint Committee on
Cybersecurity and the Maryland Cybersecurity Council work to evaluate and advance cybersecurity in
the state. There are Maryland tax credits for cybersecurity development and services. A cybersecurity
investment fund is available to provide funding for emerging cybersecurity technology development.
Maryland has a Cybersecurity Public Service Scholarship Program to support students who are pursuing
an education in programs that are directly relevant to cybersecurity.

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93 See “Security Measures for “EO-Critical Software” Use Under Executive Order (EO)
14028”, National Institute of Standards and Technology, July 9, 2021.
%20Guidance.pdf.
95 Ibid.
July 1, 2019.
September 30, 2021.
98 MD Code, Tax – General § 10-733.1. Tax credit for the purchase of cybersecurity technology or a cybersecurity
service from one or more qualified sellers. Effective June 1, 2018.
specialized development programs for cybersecurity. \(^{100}\) There are also endowments available to further basic and applied research in cybersecurity. \(^{101}\)

Yet significant barriers still exist.

According to MPSC’s Chief Engineer, none of the current MPSC engineering team members have cybersecurity expertise and there is no dedicated cybersecurity staff. \(^{102}\) Generally, MPSC engineers are hired without experience in the energy sector and without previous cybersecurity experience. \(^{103}\) This creates a very significant learning curve for new hires, who have an average tenure at MPSC of four years. The Chief Engineer expressed a need for more cybersecurity expertise within MPSC since they are facing a growing slate of cybersecurity issues. He cited salary levels as a potential barrier to hiring cybersecurity expertise. \(^{104}\)

**RECOMMENDATION 20.** Allocate funds to provide Maryland Public Service Commission with staff dedicated to regulatory cybersecurity policy, strategy, auditing, and reporting.

**RECOMMENDATION 21.** Ensure MPSC employees involved in cybersecurity activities attend periodic training to keep skills and knowledge current regarding emerging trends in distributed energy resource cybersecurity issues.

**RECOMMENDATION 22.** MPSC engineers should take an active role in standards organizations upon which they rely to ensure that cybersecurity concerns are addressed during standards development. \(^{105}\)

MPSC is funded by the utilities they regulate and MPSC sets the rates that utilities may charge. \(^{106}\) “The only statutory imperative of Public Service Commission (PSC) in regulating utility rates is to construct and approve just and reasonable rates, which, among other things, fully consider and are consistent with the public good.” \(^{107}\) Rates that the commission sets are “designed to yield to [a public utility] a ‘revenue requirement’ sufficient to pay its prudent expenses and to allow it the opportunity to earn a fair return on investments.” \(^{108}\) However, measuring a return on cybersecurity investment is complicated.

“If an organization doesn’t see cybersecurity as a strategic investment, it won’t treat the people responsible for cybersecurity as part of the strategic team. Conversely, if cybersecurity leaders are not


\(^{102}\) Interview with John Borkoski, January 19, 2021. See Appendix C for summary of interview.

\(^{103}\) Ibid.

\(^{104}\) Ibid.

\(^{105}\) For example, the MPSC relies on IEEE standards for interconnection. MPSC engineers should participate in IEEE standards efforts to contribute their knowledge about the Maryland grid and related security needs and concerns.

\(^{106}\) “The costs and expenses of the Commission and the Office of People’s Counsel shall be borne by the public service companies that are subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction.” Md. Code, Pub. Util. § 2-110 - Public Utility Regulation Fund


part of the executive team, the organization won’t have the knowledge and commitment to treat
cybersecurity as a strategic investment.”

“Workforce experts say the main reason many firms don’t list their security leaders within their top
executives is that these people typically do not report directly to the company’s board of directors or
CEO. More commonly, the CSO or CISO reports to the CTO, or to the chief information officer.”

This reporting structure can turn conflicts of interest during product selection or budget decisions into
unacceptable cybersecurity risk. This may be the case with investor-owned utilities in Maryland.

RECOMMENDATION 23. Encourage utilities to establish a procedure where cybersecurity
leadership of utilities may report directly to the company’s Board of Directors or CEO.

The People’s Counsel fills an important role in oversite and is included in the short list of representatives
who may attend the utility cybersecurity reporting briefs with the MPSC. In order to fulfill their duty
to protect the interests of residential and noncommercial users, the Office of People’s Counsel should
have access to cybersecurity expertise to participate in rate cases and other court appearances.

RECOMMENDATION 24. Expand MD Code, Public Utilities, § 2-203(f) to include cybersecurity
expertise in the list the Office of People’s Counsel may retain or hire as necessary for a
particular matter.

Other states have addressed the resource issues in different ways. For example, Michigan has created a
“Cyber Civilian Corp”(CCC), a program under which volunteers may provide services to organizations to
respond to cybersecurity incidents. The program is administered by the Michigan department of
technology, management, and budget. The CCC is available to assist critical infrastructure
organizations in rapid response. A cybersecurity incident is defined to be an event that “actually or
imminently jeopardizes the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of computers, information or
communications systems or networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or

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111 See e.g. The House Committee report on the Equifax breach which explains that the CSO reported to the chief
legal officer due to prior conflicts with CIO. The Chief Legal Officer was referred to as “head of security”.
112 See e.g. these investor owned utilities: Exelon’s “Leadership and Governance Executive Profiles” page which
“Leadership & Values” page which does not list a security officer.
https://www.bge.com/AboutUs/Pages/LeadershipValues.aspx; Pepco’s “Leadership & Values” page which does
not list a security officer. https://www.pepco.com/AboutUs/Pages/LeadershipValues.aspx; Delmarva’s page which
does not list a security officer. https://www.delmarva.com/AboutUs/Pages/LeadershipValues.aspx; Potomac
Edison’s parent company FirstEnergy’s “Leadership Team” page which does not list a security officer.
https://www.firstenergycorp.com/about/leadership_team.html
113 MPSC Order No. 89015, February 4, 2019, Case No. 9492.
116 Ibid.
information systems, or information resident on any of these.”117 The volunteers must meet qualifying criteria as determined by an advisory board.118 Volunteers must consent to a criminal background check and sign a contract.119 Michigan law declares that a CCC volunteer is not an agent of the state and the state is not liable for any damage they cause.120 In 2020 the CCC had “approximately 50 volunteers hailing from the government, academia, business, financial, and healthcare sectors.”121

Connecticut has created a Technology Talent Advisory Committee to develop pilot programs to recruit cybersecurity software developers and train state residents in cybersecurity.122

Data Privacy

Maryland electricity customer data is protected in that energy usage data and personally identifiable information may not be disclosed without the customer’s consent.123

Direct Load Control, a component of The EmPOWER Maryland Act demand response programs, allows utilities to remotely control some customers’ appliances.124 “Customers who have chosen to participate in the Direct Load Control programs ... have a switch or thermostat installed at their properties to briefly curtail usage of central air conditioning or an electric heat pump in instances of system reliability issues or high electricity prices during critical peak hours.”125

“While the utility is presumed to have the direct relationship with the consumer, there may be intermediated situations where a third-party energy service provider manages the consumer relationship as a demand-response or other aggregator, or manages Direct Load Control (DLC) on behalf of the consumer. The consumer may not be aware of all the entities involved in their participation in Time of Use (TOU) pricing programs.”126

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117 Ibid.
123 COMAR 20.62.05.10 - Disclosure of Subscriber Information.
126 NISTIR 7628 Revision 1 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity Volume 2 - Privacy and the Smart Grid. The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel – Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee. http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7628r1
RECOMMENDATION 25. The utility should make available clear, simple identification of all entities or some formal statement of the data management principle to help educate consumers as to the “data chain” that may be in place based on their relationships with utility, utility-authorized third parties, and energy service providers that are not affiliated with a utility.127

Load shaping is an alternative to Direct load Control.128 “Load shaping techniques aim to control customers’ total electric consumption and utility's load factor.”129 MPSC has a load shaping pilot program.130 The project requires a participant to “demonstrate an ability to shape customer load profiles through load shifting, peak shaving, and energy efficiency. Applicants can propose any mechanism for load shaping such as sending appropriate price signals (real time rates), using technology to control usage (controllable thermostats), payment of rebates or behavioral modification treatments. A secondary goal is to test whether load shaping can lower customer bills or reduce the customers’ overall effective rate for electricity by avoiding energy usage during high cost periods.”131

When two-way communications are implemented in load shaping, the communication channel from the consumer “may allow granular monitoring of energy consumption by appliance. Such direct monitoring may provide more accurate load management, but could also pose certain privacy risks.”132

RECOMMENDATION 26. Incorporate existing privacy standards and frameworks to identify privacy risks, then apply privacy mitigation processes to match proportionate privacy controls for each relevant business activity that creates a risk to privacy.

Privacy issues may also arise from state and utility entities sharing threat information.

RECOMMENDATION 27. Develop guidelines relating to privacy and civil liberties governing the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of cyber threat indicators by the state, including safeguards such as sanctions for activities by officers, employees, or agents of state or local Government for misuse of information.

Definitions
Establishing a common language improves the chances that expectations are understood and achieved. By defining key terms related to cyber resiliency efforts, a common language will be available to clearly communicate expectations. There are benefits to adopting established definitions, especially those that

127 Ibid.
130 In the Matter of Transforming Maryland’s Electric Distribution Systems to Ensure that Electric Service is Customer-Centered, Affordable, Reliable and Environmentally Sustainable in Maryland; PC44 Rate Design Retail Supplier Load Shaping Pilot RFP Statement of Work
131 In the Matter of Transforming Maryland’s Electric Distribution Systems to Ensure that Electric Service is Customer-Centered, Affordable, Reliable and Environmentally Sustainable in Maryland; PC44 Rate Design Retail Supplier Load Shaping Pilot RFP Statement of Work
132 NISTIR 7628 Revision 1 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity Volume 2 - Privacy and the Smart Grid. The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel – Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee. http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7628r1
have stood the test of time in a dynamic field such as cybersecurity. In particular, adopting a definition of cybersecurity and cyber resiliency will be foundational to building resiliency in the cyber domain.

For example, currently Maryland has adopted the following definition for cybersecurity in the Economic Development portion of the Code, in relation to the Cybersecurity Investment Fund:

“Cybersecurity” means information technology security. “Cybersecurity” includes the protection of networked devices, networks, programs, and data from unintended or unauthorized access, change, or destruction. “Information technology” means all electronic information processing hardware and software, including: (1) maintenance; (2) telecommunications; and (3) associated consulting services. 133

This definition covers some but not all of the five goals of cybersecurity: availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. For example, protection from “destruction” does not cover other ways in which data may become unavailable, such as infrastructure overload. Also, nonrepudiation is not covered.134 By specifying the five goals of cybersecurity in the definition, important functions will not be excluded.

RECOMMENDATION 28. Modify the current Maryland statutory definition of “cybersecurity” to include the five goals of cybersecurity so that procurement will be guided by specific reference to availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.135

In addition to defining cybersecurity, other key terms should be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 29. Adopt a statutory definition of “cyber resilience”, “critical infrastructure”, “supply chain risk”, and “critical software”.

See Appendix A Recommended Definitions for more information, including sample definitions and explanations for key terms.

Conclusion
Maryland is a leader in grid modernization efforts. Continuous integration of new technologies into the electric grid without a proportional investment and effort in securing those systems leads to unacceptable risk. By requiring Security by Design in these ongoing efforts, systems will be conceived and implemented in a more secure fashion. Adopting Zero-Trust strategies will increase resiliency in the face of advanced persistent threats. Tailoring cybersecurity reporting requirements based on program maturity will improve scarce resource allocation. Assuring state oversight efforts are properly resourced will help ensure a secure future for the Maryland electric grid.

134 Nonrepudiation is “Protection against an individual who falsely denies having performed a certain action and provides the capability to determine whether an individual took a certain action, such as creating information, sending a message, approving information, or receiving a message.” Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5, September 2020. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf.
135 Ibid.
Appendix A. Recommended Definitions

This section provides samples and descriptions of key terms that should be adopted to create a common language for cybersecurity activities. Statutes and regulations using these terms should first introduce the definitions. The context in which the terms are used may influence the definitions chosen for that particular instance. For example, defining “critical infrastructure” in the criminal code would likely require more specificity than in an emergency management statute.

Critical Infrastructure

The following detailed analysis describes how states have defined and used the term “critical infrastructure” in various contexts. The information is up-to-date as of mid-2021.

The Maryland Code does not include a definition of critical infrastructure, but uses the term in a few places, including in MD Code, State Government, § 9-2901 Maryland Cybersecurity Council. The Maryland Code of Regulations (COMAR) also uses the term, but does not define it.

A search of state and federal statutes identifies six broad categories where “critical infrastructure” is defined. See Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of examples found</th>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic/business/taxes</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency management/public safety</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Administrative/government procedure</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Military and defense</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
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Table 2 Statutory Topics Containing Definitions of “Critical Infrastructure”

Of these six categories, the criminal code definitions are distinct in their specificity, likely to satisfy the procedural due process requirements that stem from the Bill of Rights. Among the other five categories, similar structure and wording are found in many of the definitions, but wide variations in scope exist. Several states have adopted the federal definition. Other trends are visible as well.

Criminal Code Definitions

Criminal statutes that lack sufficient definiteness or specificity are commonly held “void for vagueness.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). To provide specificity, all the definitions found in criminal code include a detailed list of examples of critical infrastructure. Some statutes limit the definition to only those facilities, services, or resources listed, while others are subject to a broader interpretation by “including” examples but not restricting to only those listed. See Table 3.

For example,

“Critical infrastructure” means critical public or private infrastructure resource systems involved in providing services necessary to ensure or protect the public health, safety and welfare, including, but not limited to, a public water system or a public water source; an emergency, governmental, medical, fire or law enforcement response system; a public utility system; a financial system; an educational system; or a food or clothing distribution system. 17–A M.R.S.A. § 2
The systems and facilities most commonly listed in the criminal code address electric, water, and communications. Texas has two separate definitions for “critical infrastructure facility”, one for flying drones in restricted areas and the other for computer crimes.

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<th>citation</th>
<th>topic</th>
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<td>A.R.S. § 13-2301</td>
<td>Organized crime, fraud, and terrorism</td>
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<td>2020</td>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>17–A M.R.S.A. § 2</td>
<td>Maine Criminal Code - General Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>SDCL § 22-1-2</td>
<td>Crimes</td>
</tr>
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<td>2019</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 33.01</td>
<td>Offenses Against Property - Computer Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Iowa</td>
<td>I.C.A. § 716.11</td>
<td>Criminal Acts - criminal damage and trespass to property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-702</td>
<td>Criminal Code - offenses against property - computer crimes act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>HRS § 708-890</td>
<td>Penal Code - Offenses Against Property Rights - Computer Crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Criminal Code Definitions of Critical Infrastructure

The Federal Definition


“Critical infrastructure” means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5195c.

Note that the federal definition does not enumerate any specific types of facilities. Instead, it qualifies “systems and assets” based on the impact that would result from “incapacity or destruction”.

Six states and the District of Columbia have adopted the federal definition, modifying it slightly to make it applicable to state government. See Table 4. Michigan is the most recent state to have adopted a definition for CI, and selected the federal definition. All of the definitions adopted in the administrative and government procedure sections of the state codes followed the federal definition, specifically in relation to Freedom of Information. Five of the eleven emergency management/public safety did as well.
<table>
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<td>2020</td>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>DC ST § 2-539</td>
<td>Administrative Procedure - Freedom of Information</td>
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<td>New York</td>
<td>McKinney's Public Officers Law § 86</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>HRS § 127A-2</td>
<td>Public Safety and Internal Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>O.R.S. § 276A.500</td>
<td>Public Facilities, Contracting and Insurance - Information Technology - Oregon Geographic Information Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>A.R.S. § 41-1801</td>
<td>Public Safety - Critical Infrastructure Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>C.R.S.A. § 24-33.5-1602</td>
<td>Public Safety - Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4 - States that adopted the federal definition*

**Equipment and Property**

Another popular variation, first appearing in the 2015 Texas code, focuses on “equipment and property” used for electric, gas, water, and communications:

> “Critical infrastructure” means property and equipment owned or used by communication networks, electric generation, transmission, and distribution systems, gas distribution systems, water pipelines and related support facilities that service multiple customers and residents including, but not limited to, real and personal property such as buildings, offices, lines, poles, pipes, structures, and equipment. N.J.S.A. 54:50-40

This version is found in the economic/business/taxes and the emergency management/public safety categories of the code. See Table 5. The “but not limited to” phrase was a modification added to the Oregon Emergency Management 2015 language, then adopted by Mississippi in their 2018 Tax Code. The identical wording was adopted in the New Jersey Tax Code the following year.

**Other Definitions - Variation of Scope**

The most limited definition is the 2015 Vermont definition for Business Rapid Response for Declared State Disasters:

> “Critical infrastructure” means property and equipment owned or used by communications networks and electric generation, transmission, and distribution systems. 11 V.S.A. § 1701.

Whereas the Texas Homeland Security definition has a sweeping scope. It is the only definition that includes “morale” in the qualifiers:
“Critical infrastructure” includes all public or private assets, systems, and functions vital to the security, governance, public health and safety, economy, or morale of the state or the nation. V.T.C.A., Government Code § 421.001

North Dakota has modified the federal definition, narrowing the scope to adopt a 2017 Military – Disaster or Emergency Remediation Work. The borrowed federal definition phrases are in bold:

“Critical infrastructure” means real and personal natural gas, electrical, and telecommunication transmission property so vital to the state that the incapacity or destruction of that natural gas, electrical transmission or distribution system, or telecommunications transmission system would have a debilitating impact on public health or safety and the economic and physical security of the state or region. NDCC, 37-17.5-01

<table>
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<td>2015</td>
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<td>O.R.S. § 401.685</td>
<td>Emergency Management and Services - Disaster or Emergency Related Work Conducted by Out-of-State Businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>V.T.C.A., Bus. &amp; C. § 112.003</td>
<td>Regulation of Businesses and Services - Facilitating Business Rapid Response to State Declared Disasters Act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 - Equipment and Property Definition of Critical Infrastructure
**Critical Infrastructure by other Names**

Kentucky uses the term “Key Infrastructure assets” in the penal code and lists eleven specific categories of assets.\(^{136}\) Louisiana defines “targeted facility” in the criminal code in relation to unlawful use of drones and lists four specific categories of facilities.\(^{137}\)

**Cyber Resilience**

The reality of cybersecurity today is that there are a variety of sophisticated adversaries that can make detection of compromised systems difficult. This brings resiliency to the forefront of planning and strategy since adapting to adverse conditions is important in such an environment.

“Cyber Resilience” means “The ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises on systems that use or are enabled by cyber resources.”\(^{138}\)

“‘Resiliency’ means the ability of communities to rebound, positively adapt to, or thrive amidst changing conditions or challenges, including human-caused and natural disasters, and to maintain quality of life, healthy growth, durable systems, economic vitality, and conservation of resources for present and future generations.”\(^{139}\)

**Supply Chain Risk**

A new rule was recently published by the Federal Acquisition Regulations System that defines supply chain risk. The definition covers an extensive list of actions a person might take in an attempt to manipulate protected items.

“‘Supply Chain Risk” means the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system or covered item of supply so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of the system or item of supply.”\(^{140}\)

**Critical Software**

In May 2020, President Biden signed an executive order addressing cybersecurity issues. The order required certain federal government agencies to work together to characterize what software performs functions that are critical to trust, i.e. software used for security functions such as network control, endpoint security, and network protection.\(^{141}\) The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

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136 KRS § 511.100 Trespass upon key infrastructure assets  
137 LSA-R.S. 14:337 Unlawful use of an unmanned aircraft system  
140 Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation number AL-2021-06, September 1, 2021. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-09/AL%202021-06%20Chief%20Information%20Officer%20%20%20Supply%20%20%20%20Risk%20%20%20Management%20%28SCRMM%29.pdf  
created a definition for “critical software” to apply in the context of securing the software supply chain.\textsuperscript{142} Their method for crafting the definition involved research and collaboration with a variety of stakeholders.\textsuperscript{143} The definition will act as a basis for “guidance identifying practices that enhance the security of the software supply chain.”\textsuperscript{144}

\begin{quote}
\text{“[C]ritical software is defined as any software that has, or has direct software dependencies upon, one or more components with at least one of these attributes:}
\begin{itemize}
\item is designed to run with elevated privilege or manage privileges;
\item has direct or privileged access to networking or computing resources;
\item is designed to control access to data or operational technology;
\item performs a function critical to trust; or,
\item operates outside of normal trust boundaries with privileged access.”\textsuperscript{145}
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}

The designation of software as critical is based on the functions of the software, not its use.\textsuperscript{146} Once a definition has been established, utilities can work to identify critical software in use within their organization and follow NIST guidance on use of critical software.\textsuperscript{147}

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
Appendix B. Addressing Drone Threats to Critical Infrastructure

This section provides recommendations on the use and legislation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). UAS are relatively inexpensive, widely available, and their use is rapidly expanding. These systems can be useful tools for utilities and can also pose threats to utilities. Several states have created legislation to address drones in the context of critical infrastructure. There have been documented drone attacks on the electric grid in the US.148

Cybersecurity Recommendations Regarding Drone Use

With a complex federal statutory and regulatory environment in place, states must take care to avoid pre-emption conflicts and must be proactive in protecting constitutional rights when crafting cybersecurity rules concerning drones. See Constitutional Issues for more information.

Before entities test, acquire, install, or use drone detection, interception, or mitigation systems, federal and state criminal, surveillance, and communication laws and regulations should be carefully reviewed. Research and implement legally approved counter-UAS technology.149

Develop regulations requiring owners/operators of Critical Infrastructure facilities to provide evidence that counter-UAS technology in use complies with federal and state laws. Require owner/operators to update incident response plans to include UAS security and response strategies. Require potential UAS threats reporting in cybersecurity reporting to regulators.

Consult with the FAA regarding proposed restrictions on flight altitude, flight paths, operational bans, or any regulation of the navigable airspace. Know the air domain around the critical infrastructure and identify which government entity has authority to take action to enhance security.150

Create a registry of critical infrastructure of both government owned and privately owned facilities for state reference and in preparation for FAA implementation of Public Law 114-190.151 See “Identifying Critical Infrastructure” section below.

Adopt clear and specific definitions of key terms such as “critical infrastructure” in statutes and regulations. Adopt federal terminology and definitions were possible to avoid the need for translations between state and federal law.

Review state laws regarding digital evidence to ensure that information acquired from drones will be handled appropriately. Ensure that policy and training are in place to protect evidence and respect privacy rights.

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151 See Public Law 114-190.
Create a state emergency response plan that specifically addresses drone threats and meets federal, state, and local regulatory requirements.

Develop processes to allow UAS operators to communicate more effectively with State and local law enforcement to enable law enforcement to determine if a UAS operation poses a potential security or safety risks associated with UAS operating in close proximity to critical infrastructure.

Overview

Drones present a threat to critical infrastructure. For example, drones can carry lethal payloads that can physically damage equipment. They can be used for surveillance in planning an attack. Drones can be used to steal information from vulnerable computer systems, or simply for disruption or harassment. The Federal government has taken steps to protect federal infrastructure from these threats, and several state governments have created statutes to address the threats posed by drones.

Multiple federal entities have authorities concerning drone use. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the U.S. Department of Transportation regulates safety in the national airspace. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to counter credible threats from drones. The U.S. Attorney General is also authorized to take certain counter-drone actions and establish drone policies for federal law enforcement entities. DHS and the U.S. Attorney General coordinate with the U.S. Secretary of Transportation and the FAA before issuing any guidance if it might affect aviation safety, civilian aviation and aerospace operations, aircraft airworthiness, or the use of airspace.

To address the threat drones pose to critical infrastructure, several states have adopted statutes restricting drones from operating near critical infrastructure facilities, prohibiting lethal payloads on drones, and establishing criminal offenses such as trespass by drones. Municipalities have also attempted to restrict drone use through ordinances. In contrast, some states have restricted local governments from enacting restrictions on drone use. A limited number of court decisions are available for guidance.

Countering threats from UAS activity will become increasingly complex and will require the use of emerging and converging technologies in the future, requiring additional resources to maintain adequate security of critical infrastructure.

Highlights of Existing State Laws

Maryland

Currently Maryland has two statutes that address UAS issues explicitly. “Unmanned Aircraft” and “Unmanned Aircraft System” are defined. These definitions are circular in that each term relies on the other as a component of the definition. The Maryland definition of UA uses the term “ground control system”, which would arguably exclude a piloted drone from an airborne or open-water control system. The federal definitions for UA and UAS do not have these disadvantages.

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153 MD ECON DEV § 14-301. Laws governing the testing and operation of unmanned aircraft systems. Effective July 1, 2015.
154 In the Maryland statute MD ECON DEV § 14-301, the term “unmanned aircraft” is defined using the term “unmanned aircraft system”, and vice versa.
“Only the State may enact a law or take any other action to prohibit, restrict, or regulate the testing or operation of unmanned aircraft systems in the State.”\(^\text{155}\) The Department of Transportation is assigned to monitor the FAA for any proposed regulations or rulemaking, consult with county and local governments regarding such FAA actions, and report to the governor and general assembly.\(^\text{156}\)

“Except for federal, State, and local government entities or law enforcement services agencies, an individual may not launch, land, or retrieve an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) on any State real property without prior written approval from the Secretary or the Secretary’s designee.”\(^\text{157}\)

**Definitions**

Federal statutes and most state laws refer to drones as “unmanned aircraft”, and the remote-control system and drone together are called “unmanned aircraft systems” (UAS). However, some states use other terms.\(^\text{158}\) Most states with UAS statutes have adopted the federal terms and definitions, some with modification.

**Unmanned aircraft.** -- The term “unmanned aircraft” means an aircraft that is operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft.

**Unmanned aircraft system.** -- The term “unmanned aircraft system” means an unmanned aircraft and associated elements (including communication links and the components that control the unmanned aircraft) that are required for the operator to operate safely and efficiently in the national airspace system.

49 U.S.C.A. § 44801

Usually, the definition of UAS can be found in either the aviation or criminal section of statutes. The criminal code is often used since trespass using a drone is generally classified as a misdemeanor criminal offense.

In addition to defining UAS, states define other terms such as “operator”, “image”, and “harassment”. Failing to define UAS statute terms with specificity has been an issue in at least one federal district court case.\(^\text{159}\) The definition of “critical infrastructure” would be key in having a valid criminal statute forbidding intended harm to critical infrastructure. (See ‘Defining “Critical Infrastructure”’ for more on this topic.)

**Michigan Treats Drones as “Extensions of Self”**

Michigan enacted the “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act” in 2017 and with it created a task force to develop recommended rules governing the use of UAS within the state.\(^\text{160}\) The desire of the task force was to foster a regulatory environment that respects state and local authority but also creates an

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\(^{155}\) MD ECON DEV § 14-301. Laws governing the testing and operation of unmanned aircraft systems. Effective July 1, 2015.


\(^{157}\) Md. Code Regs. 04.05.01.08 – Department of General Services; Buildings and Grounds; Demonstrations and Rallies.

\(^{158}\) For example, Washington uses “Remote controlled aircraft”, Hawaii uses “drone”, Nevada and Indiana use “unmanned aerial vehicle”. Louisiana calls a UAS an “unmanned aerial system”, but uses “unmanned aircraft system” UAS to reference the aircraft only.

\(^{159}\) Nat'l Press Photographers Ass'n v. McCraw, 504 F. Supp. 3d 568 (W.D. Tex. 2020)

\(^{160}\) Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 259.331
innovative environment for UAS testing, development, and deploying the technology. The Task Force generated thirteen recommendations. This included a recommendation to “enact legislation establishing an “extension of self” principle. This means actions which are currently allowed or prohibited by persons would apply to persons using an UAS.” The recommendation was implemented in 2019.

Using the “extension of self” approach, a specific definition of “critical infrastructure” is not included in the Michigan penal code. This whole approach may leave a gap in prosecuting trespass based on the current Michigan trespass law. The trespass offense is defined in terms of “land and premises”. “Premises” is defined in the penal code in such a way as to reasonably exclude airspace. Since flying a drone 300 feet above a critical infrastructure facility for surveillance is something a person could not do without a drone, arguably the act is not prohibited under current Michigan laws.

Michigan also adopted a statute concerning UAS use by government entities to collect information about a regulated facility. If regulators wish to inspect a facility with a UAS, the facility owner/operator may condition the inspection on the use of the facility’s drone, or may refuse the request for using a UAS for inspection. However, the facility owner/operator must provide a written explanation giving the health and safety reasons for the condition or refusal.

In addition, any political subdivision of the state must allow for UAS operation for maintenance performed by a public utility or independent transmission company if that operation “does not result in a knowing and intentional interference with the safe use of a horse in a commercial activity.”

The Michigan aeronautics commission is responsible for providing advice to the public about regulations of UAS and restrictions on the use of UAS.

Kentucky Defines a Specific Offense for Trespass on Key Infrastructure Assets

Kentucky defines UAS and “Key infrastructure”, which includes “Any critical node of a system used in the production or generation of electrical energy.” The misdemeanor offense of Trespass Upon Key Infrastructure Assets explicitly includes reference to UAS. “A person commits the offense of trespass upon key infrastructure assets if he or she knowingly uses, or retains or authorizes a person to use, an unmanned aircraft system to fly above real property on which key infrastructure assets are located with the intent to cause harm or damage to or conduct surveillance of the key infrastructure asset without

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162 Ibid.
164 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.141a. “‘Premises’ means a permanent or temporary place of assembly, other than a residence, including, but not limited to, any of the following: (i) A meeting hall, meeting room, or conference room; (ii) A public or private park.”
165 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 259.307. Use of unmanned aircraft system to surveil, inspect, gather evidence, or collect information; conditions; disclosure of data collected; applicability.
166 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 259.305. Regulation by political subdivisions; construction with other laws
169 Ibid.
the prior consent of the owner, tenant, or lessee of the real property.” 170 In this statute, using the phrase “flying above” without specifying a height limit might create pre-emption issues.

Kentucky penal code also forbids equipping UAS with lethal payload, except for military entities and the Coast Guard.171

Pre-emption172
A major issue facing state law makers when drafting UAS legislation is pre-emption. The federal government has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States and FAA has regulatory authority over matters pertaining to aviation safety.173

Because federal registration is the exclusive means for registering UAS for purposes of operating an aircraft in navigable airspace, no state or local government may impose an additional registration requirement on the operation of UAS in navigable airspace without first obtaining FAA approval.174 Cities and municipalities are not permitted to have their own rules or regulations governing the operation of aircraft.175 However, they may generally determine the location of aircraft landing sites through their land use powers.

At least three states have addressed the pre-emption issue in statutes to some degree. Virginia adopted a pre-emption statute restricting “localities” from legislating UAS use other than for take-off and landing.176 A subsequent official advisory opinion concluded that since the term “locality” means only “a county, city, or town”,177 the Fairfax County Park Authority may adopt rules or regulations concerning the operation of unmanned aircraft systems, commonly known as drones, in its parks.178 In 2020 the Virginia House introduced a bill that would amend the rule to add “time, place, or manner restrictions regarding the takeoff or landing of unmanned aerial systems on property owned by the political subdivision.”179 The bill was not adopted.

Michigan and Delaware adopted a pre-emption clause that allows only the state government to take action to prohibit or restrict the testing and operation of UAS.180

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172 The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that federal laws are supreme, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, thus requiring that federal laws preempt any conflicting state or local regulations, see Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 427, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)).
173 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1)
174 14 C.F.R. part 107. See e.g. Singer v. City of Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D. Mass. 2017) – local ordinance’s registration requirements for pilotless aircraft were subject to conflict preemption.
176 VA Code Ann. § 15.2-926.3. Local regulation of certain aircraft.
180 MCLA 259.303. Definitions; 11 Del. C. § 1334. Unlawful use of an unmanned aircraft system; unclassified misdemeanor; class B misdemeanor; class A misdemeanor.
The City of Newton, MA was sued over portions of a city ordinance relating to ownership registration and operation of pilotless aircraft.\textsuperscript{181} The Court found that The City of Newton failed to get FAA approval for the registration requirement. Also, the restrictions on UAS flight did not limit its reach to any altitude so is “ground for preemption ... because it certainly reaches into navigable airspace.”\textsuperscript{182} The Court decided that the effective total ban on UAS flight over any part of the city without prior permission from the land owner thwarts the federal government’s objective of integrating drones into the national airspace.

Pre-emption was also an issue addressed in the Texas case.\textsuperscript{183} The Court ruled that the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) did not preempt state statutes regulating operation of unmanned aircraft flying over certain structures at under 400 feet, notwithstanding FAA’s goal of integrating unmanned aircraft into national airspace system. The Texas regulations were related to state’s police powers, federal regulations applied only to unmanned aircraft flying over 400 feet, and state’s prohibitions did not cover broad area of state’s airspace.

Federal rules require that anyone controlling a AUS keep the aircraft below an altitude of 400 feet above ground level or within a 400-foot radius of a structure.\textsuperscript{184} Taking this into account, some states have specified the height of the drone as an element of the criminal statute. Oklahoma, Texas, and Oregon make operating an unmanned aircraft lower than 400 feet above critical infrastructure a criminal offense. Tennessee sets the limit to within 250 feet of the perimeter of critical infrastructure facility. However, a Kentucky statute only specifies “flies above” which may conflict with federal authority, but limits the restriction to operators “with the intent to cause harm or damage to or conduct surveillance of the key infrastructure asset without the prior consent of the owner, tenant, or lessee of the real property.”\textsuperscript{185}

\textit{Constitutional Issues}

Constitutional issues may also be implicated in state UAS statutes. In Texas, a district court case filed by media organizations and reporters against law enforcement officials of the state sufficiently pled that the Texas statute outlining when unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) could be used to capture images impermissibly imposed speaker-based and content-based restrictions, in violation of First Amendment, by alleging that statute exempted certain speakers from liability, but subjected other speakers such as journalists to civil and criminal liability for same conduct.\textsuperscript{186}

The Plaintiffs’ also assert that state statutes regulating the use of unmanned aircraft were impermissibly vague under First Amendment Free Speech Clause and Due Process Clause by alleging that statutes did not define “surveillance” that they prohibited,\textsuperscript{187} that dictionary definitions of the term were so broad that application of surveillance provisions was unclear, and that the State had made no attempt to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{181} Singer v. City of Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d 125, 126 (D. Mass. 2017)
\item \textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n v. McCraw, 504 F. Supp. 3d 568 (W.D. Tex. 2020)
\item \textsuperscript{184} 14 CFR § 107.51(b)
\item \textsuperscript{185} KRS 511.100 Trespass upon key infrastructure assets
\item \textsuperscript{186} Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n v. McCraw, 504 F. Supp. 3d 568 (W.D. Tex. 2020)
\item \textsuperscript{187} “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” United States v. Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972))
\end{itemize}
define the term or point to any authority or evidence that outlined what type of unmanned aircraft use was prohibited under “surveillance”.

Plaintiffs’ Constitutionally based claims survived a Motion to Dismiss.188

Identifying Critical Infrastructure

In 2018, Congress ordered the Secretary of Transportation, within six months, to implement a process where critical infrastructure facilities could be registered.189 The plan has been implemented for federal facilities, but has not yet been implemented for State or local governments.190 The FAA states that the decision as to which facilities could be added to the “Security Sensitive Airspace Restriction list” is not within their authority.

In April 2020, the US Attorney General provided instructions to Department of Justice (DOJ) components on the processes and standards for seeking the Department’s designation of a DOJ facility or asset for protection, as well as the legal framework for exercising measures to protect those designated facilities and assets.191 “The request will describe the facility or asset proposed for designation with specificity, including its nature and location; its surroundings, including proximity to air traffic, airports, air traffic control facilities, or other airspace features; whether it is stationary or mobile; and whether a significant portion of the facility or asset belongs to or is operated by any person or entity other than the Department.”192

In October 2020, a group of commercial drone owner/operators wrote an open letter urging action by the federal government to implement the process for registering critical infrastructure.193 The letter states, “the tremendous growth of the UAS industry prompted many state and local policymakers to enact legally questionable UAS operating restrictions around many different types of facilities, some of which directly challenge the federal sovereignty of the National Airspace System.” It claims that state and local statutes are “impacting the public’s right to access navigable airspace and putting operators at risk of local prosecution even when flying in accordance with FAA regulations” and that these laws “create an unworkable patchwork of prohibitions that impacts UAS operators’ access to airspace and thus should be addressed expeditiously.”

The current situation leaves law enforcement, critical infrastructure facilities, and drone operators in an ambiguous enforcement environment.

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189 Pub. L. 114-190 s. 2209.
190 FAA response to email inquiry received from uashelp@faa.org on 6/8/21. The response stated, “only Federal properties are eligible to be on the Security Sensitive Airspace Restriction list, although the FAA is working on a mechanism to eventually make this eligibility available to state and local governments. Eligible federal entities must contact Dept of Energy, Dept of Interior, or Dept of Defense, as applicable, to see if those agencies want to include the facility on the list. The decision is not the FAA’s.”
192 Ibid.
Conclusions
A variety of state laws created to protect critical infrastructure have developed recently. Several states have adopted definitions of “unmanned aircraft systems” and “critical infrastructure”, and created criminal trespass offenses for drones flying over or near critical infrastructure. At least one state has treated drones as an extension of self in terms of prohibited acts. States have addressed the issue of pre-emption relating to both federal and local rules. It would be helpful to all concerned to have clear notice of areas where drones are prohibited and the conditions under which the prohibition applies.
Appendix C. Interview with MPSC Chief Engineer (January 19, 2021)

I had the pleasure of meeting with the Chief Engineer of the Maryland Public Service Commission (MPSC). He worked for 35 years as an engineer at BGE and eventually became Vice President (VP) of Engineering, managing the regulatory relationships for the utility with the MPSC Engineering Division. He worked with MPSC regulators and has known every MPSC Chief Engineer since the late 1980s. He was also the NERC CIP audit executive sponsor for their 2014 audit, leading BGE in the Federal regulatory efforts related to transmission grid cybersecurity. He retired from BGE in 2015, then in 2017 was requested to consider applying for the open MPSC Chief Engineering position. It is clear the Chief Engineer came to MPSC with a deep understanding of the regulatory process as seen from the utility company perspective.

The MPSC Chief Engineer described the MPSC Engineering Division as a group of sixteen engineers, all who have come to MPSC with no experience in the utility industry. Five of these engineers are on the team that gets involved in cybersecurity. The MPSC Engineering Division has three open positions presently. None of the current team members have cybersecurity expertise and there is no dedicated cybersecurity staff. The team is learning about utilities and cybersecurity. Chief Engineer expressed a need for more cybersecurity expertise since they are facing cybersecurity issues more and more. He cited salary levels as a potential barrier to hiring cybersecurity expertise.

One source of support used and appreciated by MPSC Engineers is the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC). He said that NARUC had released new products in 2020 to gather and evaluate information from utilities about their cybersecurity risk management and preparedness. These tools haven’t yet been integrated into MPSC processes. These products may influence the reporting process currently in use. Members of the MPSC Engineering Team will be attending the NARUC cybersecurity training for three days in February. NARUC was also a helpful resource in understanding the Solarwinds incident and potential impacts.

The Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) was also mentioned as a useful liaison for cybersecurity.

The Chief Engineer mentioned that the NERC GridX exercise brought to light cybersecurity issues but it is difficult to estimate the impact they might have or to develop a standard way to deal with the information gained. He thinks it might be helpful to get the utilities together and come up with different levels of impact and to categorize impacts. For cybersecurity breach incidents, the MPSC encourages utilities to interact with the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and MCAC initially. MPSC receives information later. GridX participation also emphasized the interrelationship between physical security and cyber security.

MPSC ordered the creation of a Cybersecurity Reporting Working Group (CSRWG) in 2018. Chief Engineer led that group and authored a report presented to MPSC commissioners with a proposed process for utilities to inform MPSC about their cybersecurity strategies, implementations, and breaches. MPSC adopted the proposals, with modification, and the first cybersecurity reporting took place in 2019. Utilities would report once every three years, a time period in sync with the FERC auditing schedule. MPSC started with the two largest utilities in 2019 and planned for others to report in 2020 and 2021. However, the COVID-19 emergency suspended the reporting process since in-person
meetings were to be avoided for health reasons and providing sensitive information in virtual meetings was not an option the participants found acceptable.

The information that came from the reporting centered on metrics such as phishing attempts, intrusion attempts, and cybersecurity program maturity levels. Both the C2M2 and the NIST Framework are used by utilities in the state. Both of the reporting utilities referenced maturity models. The NARUC list of questions from their Cybersecurity Primer were used a bit, but mostly the Commissioners were heavily engaged with their own questions and also relied on senior advisors for their preparation and back office work.

The MPSC will complete one reporting cycle and then the CSRWG will be reconvened to review lessons learned. To date, only two utilities have reported. Chief Engineer noted that of the two, one utility was more transparent than the other. A discussion was held by Chief Engineer on the need to improve transparency between the regulators and that utility company in future briefings. He noted that no entity wants to look bad in front of a regulator, and so the “Nothing to See Here” approach may be an issue that needs to be addressed. Utilities want to avoid follow-up from regulators. In his experience, information coming from utilities to regulators is tightly controlled, and presentations and statements to be made are reviewed and edited by in-house counsel.

There is no formal mechanism for follow-up after the periodic reporting meeting takes place. Chief Engineer said there are no on-site inspections for cybersecurity. The current process provides for a half day meeting with specified participants from the utility, the MPSC, and the People’s Counsel. The CSRWG will further consider the frequency of cybersecurity program reporting after the first cycle of utility reports are completed.

Part of the 2018 CSRWG report included proposed regulatory language. I asked Chief Engineer why that language had not yet been incorporated into COMAR. He said MPSC wanted to gain experience with the reporting before codifying the recommendations. This would allow for modification based on lessons learned during the first reporting cycle. He felt that the regulations recommended were on target so far, but in light of the Solarwinds incident, a broader approach may be needed. There will also need to be consideration given to an assessment phase after the reporting phase is completed. Chief Engineer also said that the gas and water side of the MPSC Engineering Division is currently not involved with cybersecurity, but gas and water utilities are included in the MPSC cybersecurity reporting procedures developed by the CSRWG.

Chief Engineer stated that MD Delegate Neil Parrott had introduced bills in the past related to utility cybersecurity and physical security multiple times, but those bills were not adopted.

We discussed cybersecurity funding by the utilities. Chief Engineer stated that a multi-year rate plan was a “forward-looking” view to spending. This is a new approach to rate recovery. The usual “backward-looking” approach allows utilities to plan their systems and programs with a determination if their expenses were prudently incurred to be made after the expenses have been incurred. Forward-looking rate cases can potentially affect future operations of the utilities if the utility adjusts spending on systems and programs as a result of a disallowance. MPSC Engineering Division Staff has to be careful when recommending disallowing expenses in a forward-looking approach because if a denial of funds for a particular purpose ultimately can be pointed to as a cause of a problem, then the utility may come back and place blame for the problem on the denial of funds. This approach clouds accountability.
between the utility company and regulators, which will be required to pass judgment on the utility if something goes wrong. For rate cases, MPSC staff has to take an independent approach that considers both the utility company view and the consumer view when making recommendations to the Commission.

Chief Engineer described the difficulty in addressing cybersecurity funding in a rate case since sensitive information related to spending is difficult to disclose in that forum and associated discovery requests to the utilities are treated confidentially. There is a need for more specific and detailed information about funding needs in the periodic cybersecurity reporting with the MPSC. However, rate cases are filed by utilities as the need arises and not on any predetermined schedule. Cybersecurity reporting is currently on a three year schedule. Therefore, timing the of funding disclosures during periodic cybersecurity reporting doesn’t naturally sync with rate case schedules.
Appendix D. Standards and Security Guidelines for Distributed Energy Resources¹⁹⁴

- IEEE C37.240 2014: IEEE Standard Cybersecurity Requirements for Substation Automation,
- Protection, and Control Systems
- NIST SP 800 82 Revision 2: Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security
- NIST Interagency/Internal Report 7628: Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- IEEE 2030.5 2018: SEP2 Smart Energy Profile 2.0
- NERC Reliability Guideline : Cyber Intrusion Guide for System Operators
- IEC 62351 : Information Security for Power System Control Operations
- IEC 62443 : Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security
- DOE/DHS ES C2M2 : Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES C2M2)
- DOE/NIST/NERC RMP : Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Risk Management Process Guideline
- IEEE 1547.3: Guide for Cybersecurity of DERs Interconnected with Electric Power Systems
- Potential to leverage ISA/IEC 62443 for DER: Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for DER

¹⁹⁴ This list was part of a presentation to the California Public Utility Commission on January 14, 2014 given by UL.
Appendix E. Summary of Recommendations

**RECOMMENDATION 1.** Amend Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. § 7-213(e)(1)(i) “Service quality and reliability standards” to include “cyber resiliency” in the list of topics to be addressed by the standards.

**RECOMMENDATION 2.** Climate change is a long-term problem that motivates modernization of the electric grid. Solutions to address climate change must not invite near-term catastrophe. Any changes to the grid made for the sake of resiliency, efficiency, conservation, or climate change concerns must be accompanied by a careful assessment to document security risks prior to grid integration and implement appropriate mitigations during integration. The risk assessments must take into account the scope of specific projects and the project’s interfaces with other systems.

**RECOMMENDATION 3.** Define “resilience” to include “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from deliberate attacks” so that cybersecurity will be an essential factor in determining system resilience.

**RECOMMENDATION 4.** Require utility providers to adopt security best practices such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and advance toward zero-trust architecture both with on-premises services and cloud services. Report to regulators on steps already completed. Identify the steps that will have the most immediate security impact, and a schedule to implement them.

**RECOMMENDATION 5.** Require utility providers to incrementally implement zero trust principles, process changes, and technology solutions that protect data assets and business functions by use case. Develop and maintain dynamic risk-based policies for resource access. Authenticate all connections and encrypt data. Design cybersecurity of newly interconnected resources around zero-trust principles.

**RECOMMENDATION 6.** Consult with grid owners and operators, and state and local government agencies to establish a process to identify, assess, and prioritize risks to the electric grid, considering current and foreseeable future cyber and physical threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Apply the process to periodically report to regulators on the risks. Use the report to establish a risk-based grant program focused on systematically increasing the resilience of the electric grid against the prioritized cybersecurity risks where market forces do not provide sufficient private-sector incentives to mitigate the risk without Government investment.

**RECOMMENDATION 7.** Maryland is a leader in grid modernization efforts in the US. Engage state employees in cybersecurity standards development efforts to share knowledge and insights, and influence future directions.

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RECOMMENDATION 8. Include a formal requirement for all state funded grant recipients working on electric grid resilience or modernization to address cybersecurity risk both in the design and reporting phases of their work.

RECOMMENDATION 9. Include a formal requirement for all MPSC working groups developing policy and planning for the grid to address cybersecurity risk in the reporting phase of their work.

RECOMMENDATION 10. Require electric grid resilience or modernization pilot programs to establish formal requirements for a cybersecurity plan. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities arise from weaknesses in: policy and procedure; architecture and design; configuration and maintenance; supply chain; hardware; physical access controls; software development; and communications and networks. An effective cybersecurity plan must address all of these areas.

RECOMMENDATION 11. Maturity level of a cybersecurity program should be a factor in establishing an appropriate reporting period for each utility. Each utility should provide sufficient evidence to establish the maturity level of the company’s cybersecurity program. The MPSC should then tailor the reporting period accordingly. For utilities that can provide persuasive evidence of a high level of maturity in their cybersecurity program, three years may be an adequate MPSC reporting period. For less mature programs, more frequent reporting to evidence growth in maturity level is recommended. An example of a maturity model available is The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) Version 2.0 (V2.0) which was released in July 2021.

RECOMMENDATION 12. Information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems of utilities were likely developed separately and with separate groups of people. However, without strict network segregation, vulnerabilities in IT enable attacks on OT. Regulators must understand the extent to which utility IT and OT security experts work together to protect the grid and make recommendations to enhance communication within utility provider entities.

RECOMMENDATION 13. Utilities should work together and report together on risks and cybersecurity events. Bring GridEx participants together after the exercises are complete to assess and categorize impacts of issues that were identified.

RECOMMENDATION 14. Each confidential cybersecurity brief required should be accompanied by a written report suitable for public release that summarizes the cybersecurity efforts of the company, especially with respect to modernization efforts.

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198 GridEx, a distributed play grid exercise that allows participants to engage remotely, simulates a cyber and physical attack on the North American electricity grid and other critical infrastructure. Led by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), GridEx gives participants a forum to demonstrate how they would respond to and recover from coordinated cyber and physical security threats and incidents. https://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Pages/GridEx.aspx
**RECOMMENDATION 15.** When smart meters were incorporated into the Maryland power grid, utilities were required to publicize security information about the change. This practice should be continued to include changes created by DER integration.\(^{199}\)

**RECOMMENDATION 16.** Although details of security processes and mechanisms should be protected as sensitive information, general information about utility security programs should be publicly available and easily accessible.\(^{200}\)

**RECOMMENDATION 17.** Require all utilities that rely on third party IT or OT providers to include standard contract language with service providers to collect and preserve data for cybersecurity analysis and share such data, or report third party security breaches to the utility or to a government entity such as CISA.

**RECOMMENDATION 18.** Adopt the NIST definition of "critical software" and require utilities to maintain a list of the categories of software and software products in use or in acquisition that meet the definition. Adopt NIST security guidance for critical software use, applying practices of least privilege, network segmentation, and proper configuration.\(^{201}\)

**RECOMMENDATION 19.** Require utilities to establish minimum security standards for IT and OT devices commensurate with the level of security risk applicable to such devices and specifically take into account any security risk associated with supply chains.

**RECOMMENDATION 20.** Allocate funds to provide Maryland Public Service Commission with staff dedicated to regulatory cybersecurity policy, strategy, auditing, and reporting.

**RECOMMENDATION 21.** Ensure MPSC employees involved in cybersecurity activities attend periodic training to keep skills and knowledge current regarding emerging trends in distributed energy resource cybersecurity issues.

**RECOMMENDATION 22.** MPSC engineers should take an active role in standards organizations upon which they rely to ensure that cybersecurity concerns are addressed during standards development.\(^{202}\)

**RECOMMENDATION 23.** Encourage utilities to establish a procedure where cybersecurity leadership of utilities may report directly to the company’s Board of Directors or CEO.

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\(^{199}\) See e.g. “SMART METERS AND YOUR PRIVACY”, BGE informational brochure for customers. Author unknown, undated.
https://www.bge.com/SmartEnergy/SmartMeterSmartGrid/Documents/SmartMeters_HEALTHPRIVACYINFO.pdf

\(^{200}\) See e.g. PJM (a regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia) webpage that talks about cybersecurity practices at a very high level. https://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/keeping-the-lights-on/safeguarding-the-grid.


\(^{202}\) For example, the MPSC relies on IEEE standards for interconnection. MPSC engineers should participate in IEEE standards efforts to contribute their knowledge about the Maryland grid and related security needs and concerns.
RECOMMENDATION 24. Expand MD Code, Public Utilities, § 2-203(f) to include cybersecurity expertise in the list the Office of People's Counsel may retain or hire as necessary for a particular matter.

RECOMMENDATION 25. The utility should make available clear, simple identification of all entities or some formal statement of the data management principle to help educate consumers as to the “data chain” that may be in place based on their relationships with utility, utility-authorized third parties, and energy service providers that are not affiliated with a utility.203

RECOMMENDATION 26. Incorporate existing privacy standards and frameworks to identify privacy risks, then apply privacy mitigation processes to match proportionate privacy controls for each relevant business activity that creates a risk to privacy.

RECOMMENDATION 27. Develop guidelines relating to privacy and civil liberties governing the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of cyber threat indicators by the state, including safeguards such as sanctions for activities by officers, employees, or agents of state or local Government for misuse of information.

RECOMMENDATION 28. Modify the current Maryland statutory definition of “cybersecurity” to include the five goals of cybersecurity so that procurement will be guided by specific reference to availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.204

RECOMMENDATION 29. Adopt a statutory definition of “cyber resilience”, “critical infrastructure”, “supply chain risk”, and “critical software”.

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203 NISTIR 7628 Revision 1 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity Volume 2 - Privacy and the Smart Grid. The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel – Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee. http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7628r1

204 Nonrepudiation is “Protection against an individual who falsely denies having performed a certain action and provides the capability to determine whether an individual took a certain action, such as creating information, sending a message, approving information, or receiving a message.” Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5, September 2020. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf.
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